![]() In August 2010, the Dutch redeployed their forces after being active in Afghanistan for four years, aiding and abetting ISAF with around 2000 troops each rotation. The main objective of this study is to show the existence and plausibility of different explanations, and also therefore, to add to the breadth of conceptual tools practitioners should understand when they find themselves thrown into irregular war. ![]() While we can't decisively evaluate the efficacy of COIN doctrine in Iraq here, it is important to realize that there are greatly different potential explanations for the actual conduct and course of the war, which furthermore differ by region. COIN doctrine drive outcomes on the ground, or are there alternate explanations for these outcomes? That is, if correlation is not causation, then what else explains the course of the war in Iraq? To answer these questions, we introduce a specific analytical framework-describing the mechanisms which shift populations into differing degrees of insurgent or counterinsurgent behavior-to guide the selection of facts, topics, and subjects in the sections that follow, as well as to identify important open questions and data requirements needed to evaluate them. We begin with the overarching question: Did the implementation of U.S. The correlation of Iraq’s plunging violence in 2007 with rising force levels (the surge) and a new set of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics offered a tempting recipe for success in irregular warfare.
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